Operational Shock and Crash Safety – RTCA DO-160

What Is Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160?

DO-160 Section 7 defines tests with two distinct purposes. Operational shock tests whether the equipment maintains function under events such as hard landing and turbulence. Crash safety tests whether the equipment stays attached to its mounting under crash loads and does not become a projectile in the cabin; here, retention is required, not function.

Purpose of Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

The purpose is to assure the equipment keeps working during normal flight events and, in a crash, does not create a secondary hazard to passengers and critical systems.

Which Products Is Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Applied To?

Avionics units and rack-mounted equipment
Cabin equipment and furnishings
Battery and power units
Mounting racks, brackets and fasteners
UAV mission payloads

In Which Sectors Is Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Used?

AerospaceSpaceDefenceElectronics

Standards Related to Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

RTCA DO-160Environmental conditions and test methods in aviation equipment test

Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Conditions

Test type: Operational shock (function preserved) and crash safety (retention required)
Pulse shape: The terminal sawtooth or similar pulse profile defined in the standard
Level and duration: From the standard's table, per the equipment's category
Axes: In three axes and the required directions

Equipment for Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

Shock test rig (shock table)
Accelerometers and pulse profile control system
Constant acceleration (centrifuge) rig for crash safety
Mounting fixtures
Function monitoring and high-speed camera

Sample Requirements for Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

The equipment must be supplied in the final configuration of the design being certified.
The installation zone on the aircraft and its corresponding categories must be declared.
Cable types, lengths and the connection layout must reflect the real installation.
The functional check procedure and acceptance criterion must be provided in writing.
The software version and hardware revision must be recorded.

Duration of Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

The pulses are short; duration is set by fixture preparation, axis changes and interim inspections. A typical study takes a few days.

Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Procedure

1The equipment's category and mounting arrangement are determined.
2A fixture representing the aircraft mounting is prepared.
3A functional check is performed before the test.
4Operational shock pulses are applied in each axis and function is monitored.
5The crash safety procedure (pulse or constant acceleration) is applied.
6Mounting joints and structural integrity are examined.
7A functional check is performed after the test.

Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Acceptance Criteria

The severity level and acceptance criterion come not from the method standard but from the specification the product is subject to: for MIL-STD-810 applications, the product's environmental life cycle profile and procurement specification are decisive; for DO-160 applications, it is the category corresponding to the equipment's installation zone on the aircraft. This page therefore gives no numerical limit.

Evaluation of Results

For operational shock, the equipment is required to maintain function. For crash safety, loss of function is acceptable; what is required is that the equipment does not separate from its mounting and its structural parts do not become projectiles. The acceptance criteria for the two procedures therefore differ.

Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160 Report

Equipment identification, part number and configuration
Standard, revision and method/section number applied
Selected severity level or category and its basis
Test rig, mounting arrangement and measurement points
Functional checks performed before, during and after the test
Measurement results, observations and photographs
Non-conformities and any test deviations
A statement that the result applies only to the specimen submitted for testing

Accreditation

EUROLAB holds internationally recognised accreditation obtained from accreditation bodies party to the IAF and ILAC multilateral recognition arrangements, under ISO/IEC 17025 for laboratory testing, ISO/IEC 17020 for inspection and surveillance, and ISO/IEC 17021-1 and ISO/IEC 17065 for system and product certification. This chain ensures the reports and certificates issued are accepted worldwide.

Whether this test can be offered within accredited scope depends on your product and the standard applied; since accreditation is method-based, the scope is confirmed in writing at the quotation stage.

Scope and authorisations

Related Regulations

RTCA DO-160 / EUROCAE ED-14 (environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment)
Certification requirements under EASA CS-25 / FAA 14 CFR Part 25
The equipment manufacturer's TSO/ETSO approval requirements

Aerospace Testing — What Does This Testing Field Cover?

The section below describes the field that the Operational Shock and Crash Safety test belongs to; the conditions and acceptance criteria of this particular test are given in the sections above. The scope specific to your product is confirmed in writing at the quotation stage.

Aerospace testing shows that equipment keeps working in the flight environment and provides evidence for the airworthiness file. In this family the acceptable probability of failure is several orders of magnitude lower than in other sectors; this directly determines the scope of testing and the certification burden.

The most distinctive feature of the field is TRACEABILITY. Which melt an aircraft part came from, in which heat treatment furnace and with which cycle it was processed, which operator made the weld and which inspector approved it are all recorded. The test report is one link in this chain; if the chain is broken, the report carries no value on its own.

Environmental qualification runs through RTCA DO-160, with categories selected according to the equipment's MOUNTING LOCATION in the aircraft. A device mounted on the cockpit panel and one mounted inside the wing pass the same section under different categories. When reading a DO-160 report it is therefore essential to know which sections were applied at which categories.

On the software and complex hardware side the approach changes entirely: the evidence is not testing but PROCESS ASSURANCE. DO-178C for software and DO-254 for complex electronic hardware define how the development process is to be run and which evidence is to be produced. Every step, from requirement to code, from testing of the code to coverage analysis, must be traceable. Testing software does not make it certifiable; the process record does.

A separate body of work applies on the material and special process side. AWS D17.1 is used for welding, SAE AMS 2750 for pyrometry in heat treatment and NAS 410 for non-destructive testing personnel. For special processes (heat treatment, coating, welding, NDT, bonding) NADCAP accreditation is effectively mandatory in the supply chain; without NADCAP it is not possible to sell parts to many OEMs.

On the quality system side the AS/EN 9100 series is used: 9100 for manufacturers, 9110 for maintenance organisations and 9120 for distributors. Without these certificates it is practically impossible to enter the aerospace supply chain, and audits are markedly more detailed than in other sectors.

Counterfeit part risk is a subject peculiar to the field. Separate standards and verification methods (visual inspection, X-ray, decapsulation and internal structure examination, XRF) are used to detect counterfeit or reworked parts in the electronic component supply chain.

Space applications add further layers: outgassing in vacuum, radiation tolerance, long-duration thermal vacuum cycling and assessment of single event effects.

Method groups in this field

Environmental qualification
RTCA DO-160 sections: temperature and altitude, vibration, shock, humidity, sand and dust, fungus, salt fog, fluid susceptibility, icing, lightning.
Electromagnetic
The EMC sections of DO-160; MIL-STD-461 and MIL-STD-704 power characteristics on military platforms.
Software and hardware assurance
DO-178C software life cycle and DO-254 hardware design assurance evidence; requirement traceability and coverage analysis.
Materials and welding
Welding qualification under AWS D17.1, mechanical testing of materials, metallography and non-destructive examination.
Special process control
SAE AMS 2750 pyrometry, coating and heat treatment process verification, preparation for NADCAP audits.
Space environment
Thermal vacuum cycling, outgassing, radiation tolerance and acoustic/vibration qualification.

Commonly confused in this field

There is no such document as a "DO-160 certificate"; DO-160 is a test specification and its output is a qualification report.
The selection of sections and categories comes from the customer's equipment specification; the laboratory cannot make that selection on its own.
DO-178C and DO-254 cannot be satisfied by testing; the evidence is the traceability of the development process.
An AS9100 certificate is not a product approval; it is a quality system certificate and part approval runs separately.
For special processes, work carried out without NADCAP is not accepted in the supply chain even when it is technically correct.
MIL-STD-810 and DO-160 are often confused: one is a military and the other a civil aviation specification, and their profiles differ.

Which decisions these results support

Airworthiness and TSO/ETSO files
Entry into the aerospace supply chain and supplier approval
Special process approval and NADCAP preparation
Determining the impact of a design change on qualification
Managing counterfeit part risk and component verification

Related Tests

Frequently Asked Questions About Operational Shock and Crash Safety — RTCA DO-160

Can the equipment be used after the crash safety test?

Usually not, and there is no need for it to be. The test's purpose is not for the equipment to keep working but to stay in place; this procedure is considered destructive.

Must the fixture be an actual rack?

The mounting arrangement must represent the aircraft installation. If the actual rack and fasteners are not used, the result does not show the installation's real strength.